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CHALLENGING THE CONDEMNOR'S RIGHT TO
CONDEMN: AVOIDANCE OF
PERIPHERAL DAMAGES
One of the most difficult political and moral problems regarding large-
scale public improvement projects is providing full compensation to the
landowner for losses which occur in the long period between public an-
nouncement and property acquisition. In broad outline, the process of
planning and condemnation consists of advance project planning, public
announcements of, and hearings on the project, filing of condemnation
petition, valuation of the property, and determination of compensation
at trial. While the landowner is compensated for the loss of possession
of his property, earlier losses (in the form of depreciation, loss of tenants,
and non-marketability of the property) following the designation of the
project are not compensated. This is true because the earliest time at
which the value of the property can legally be determined is the date of
the filing of the condemnation petition.'
This problem is particularly acute when the landowner challenges the
right of the condemnor to condemn his land. The owner who feels his chal-
lenge will be successful may continue to repair and improve his property
even after the petition to condemn is filed. If it is found that the con-
demnor is acting properly, the owner will not be compensated for im-
provements made after the filing. The problem is exacerbated in the case
of a successful challenge,2 whether the owner is optimistic or pessimistic.
1. Housing Auth. of the City of Decatur v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d
188, rev'd on other grounds, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d 226 (1966); Chicago Housing
Auth. v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve
Dist., 377 Ill. 208, 36 N.E.2d 245 (1941) ; Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain:
Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. Cmr. L. Rav. 319, 329 (1963); Com-
ment, Modernizing Illinois Eminent Domain Procedures, 48 Nw. U.L. Rav. 484, 487
(1953) and cases there cited; see St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144
(Mo. 1964).
2. It must be questioned, however, whether it is realistic to assume that the owner can
successfully challenge the public action. See Costello, Challenging the Right to Condemn,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 52, 53.
There seems to be a general reluctance on the part of the courts to intervene if
there is a proper exercise of the eminent domain power, even to prevent financial losses
resulting from project execution. Many courts have indicated that such problems arc for
the legislature. Note, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by
Eminent Domain, 1964 Dunn L.J. 123, 125. Even in the case of an improper taking, the
reluctance of the courts to inhibit the eminent domain power is apparent. In Caruthers
v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d 713 (1944), a public utility
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If the owner has maintained and improved his property, it will have
declined in value due to the deterioration of the neighborhood. And if he
has been pessimistic, he is left in possession of property sorely in need of
repairs and improvement.3
It is important to determine at what point in the proceedings the con-
demnee can challenge the condemnor's right to condemn, because the
earlier he can successfully challenge, the smaller will be the losses of the
successful owner or of the unsuccessful owner who has maintained his
property while challenging. The owner is in an almost impossible position.
He cannot practically challenge the right early enough to preclude dam-
ages, yet courts have defined the term "taking" such that he cannot be
compensated for damages resulting from delay. An early challenge serves
both to settle the rights of the parties and to avoid uncompensable damages.
This note will examine the nature of the damages involved, the rules gov-
erning the time at which the challenge can be raised, and the alternatives
for providing an early yet practical challenge.
I. PERIPHERAL DAMAGES: NATURE AND OCCURRENCE
The damages that can be avoided through an early challenge to the
condemnor's right will be referred to throughout this note as peripheral
damages.' This term indicates the depreciation the property suffers' and
the freeze upon the owner's right to sell6 during the period before the taking,
took plaintiff's land without using the eminent domain power which it possessed. The
court remonstrated against such action, firmly stated that the utility company was liable
for damages in trespass and ejectment, and said the owner was entitled to a mandatory
injunction. The court held, however, that the injunction should be delayed to give the
utility a reasonable time to establish its right to take.
3. An analogy can be drawn to the situation in which the proceedings are discon-
tinued by the public agency. A subsequent finding of a lack of right would be similar to
a discontinuance, because in both cases there would be a cessation of proceedings without
compensation, after damages have been suffered. See Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n,
304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957); Sorbino v. New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d
473 (1957) (dictum); City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964), cert, denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); 6 P. NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAin §§ 26.4,
26.45 (Rev. 3d ed. 1950). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 355 (1961).
4. The English call these damages "planning blight" and provide a procedure to
compel compensation. Town & Country Planning Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 53, Part IV;
Glaves, supra note 1, at 344-45.
5. See St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964); City of
Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (C.P. Cuyahoga County
1961) ; Glaves, supra note 1, at 344-45.
6. See City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); Limerick, Procedures Under the Illinois Eminent Domain
Act, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4.
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as distinguished from the direct damage which the owner sustains by being
physically deprived of his property. Peripheral damages may occur when
surrounding landowners move out and allow their properties to fall into
disrepair.' Not even owner occupancy can prevent decline: it is pointless
to expend large amounts for maintenance and repair since the property is
under threat of condemnation.' The owner, resident or not, who has space
to rent, will lose income when he is unable, because of neighborhood decay,
to replace tenants who move out.' Loss of income further discourages
maintenance, which further discourages prospective tenants. Buildings
are soon abandoned to vermin and vandals." Peripheral damages thus
have a reinforcing effect: once begun, the decline feeds upon itself.
There are a number of delays in the planning and condemnation process
during which peripheral damages can accumulate. While a delay of five
years between project planning and the commencement of condemnation
proceedings is common, there are instances of delay of as much as thirteen
years." After the condemnation petition has been filed, the property may
not be viewed for valuation purposes' 2 for many more months, and there
7. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); St. Louis Housing
Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964); City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio
Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961); City of Houston v. Biggers,
380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); STAFF oF
HOUSE ComM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR
PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY As-
SISTED PROGRAMS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., 64-65 (Comm. Print 1964); see Olson &
French, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 266, 160 A.2d 401 (1960).
8. Mandelker, Planning the Freeway: Interim Controls in Highway Programs, 1964
DUKE L.J. 439, 460; see City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
9. See Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 470, 7 P.2d 622 (1932), overruled on
other grounds, In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 (1934); Housing Auth. of
the City of Decatur v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188, reu'd on other
grounds, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d 226 (1966); City of Cincinnati v. Mandel, 38 Ohio
Op. 2d 157, 224 N.E.2d 179 (C.P. Hamilton County 1966); City of Houston v. Biggers,
380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); State v.
Vaughan, 319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
10. See Housing Auth. of the City of Decatur v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 148
S.E.2d 188, rev'd on other grounds, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d 226 (1966); Chicago
Housing Auth. v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); St. Louis Housing
Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964); City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio
Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961).
11. Glaves, supra note 1, at 327 & n.49. See also Mandelker, supra note 8.
12. "View" is the term used to describe the examination of condemned property by a
board of appraisers (sometimes called viewers or commissioners) for valuation purposes.
Pennsylvania procedure is typical. In each county there is a three to nine member board,
appointed by the judges of the court of common pleas for a term of three to six years.
The appraisers are attorneys, tax assessors, or other appraisal experts. Three board mem-
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is another time lag between the view and the trial at which the compen-
sation is actually determined. The stage at which the peripheral damages
begin to accumulate will depend on when the community realizes the
project will actually be performed. Since this may be different in each city,
the holdings vary as to when peripheral damages occur. Courts have been
called upon to recognize the occurrence of these damages at three points
in the process: announcement, designation, and filing of petition." Most
courts have refused even to recognize the existence of any damages prior
to taking of possession by the public agency. Those that do recognize the
existence of peripheral damages have held such injury non-compensable
because it doesn't constitute a taking. This refusal to define a taking as
occurring earlier than physical dispossession has created the problem of
uncompensated damages."
The bare announcement of intent to undertake a project may be suf-
ficient, even before its exact boundaries are defined, to affect market values
(in which event it is possible that property will be depreciated though it
is ultimately decided not to include it in the project). The announcement
of a renewal or highway plan will mean an end to improvement and main-
tenance in the community and will depreciate property values at least until
the scope of the plan is clarified.' 5 These effects can be particularly harm-
ful in an area designated in part for conservation and rehabilitation, be-
cause deterioration will render the program more costly and difficult. 6
Despite these problems, courts have either denied the existence of any
bers, appointed by the trial court, constitute the panel assigned to value the property
in any particular case. The view consists of an actual visit to the site, although the
panel may also hear evidence and examine witnesses. After the view has been com-
pleted, a report as to the value of the property and the amount of the owner's damages
is filed with the court. A majority of the panel must concur in the report. Some statutes
designate the time of the view and the return date of the report, although the Pennsyl-
vania code leaves these matters to the appraisers' discretion, merely cautioning them to
act promptly. At the trial, the appraisers' report is admitted as evidence of the
owner's damages, but the owner is permitted to contest the report and submit his own
evidence. The jury may make its own view of the property. E. SNITZER, PENNSYLVANIA
EMINENT DOmAIN §§ 503, 504, 504-2, 510-2, 511-2, 701-1, 801 (1965).
13. Cf. Glaves, supra note 1, at 327.
14. See State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 180-81, 112 A.2d 857, 861
(1955); Housing Auth. of the City of Decatur v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d
226, rev'g 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188 (1966).
15. HousE CoMm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, supra note 7, at 64; Glaves, supra note 1,
at 327-28; Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban
Deterioration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 525 (1959).
16. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deteriora-
tion, 72 HAv. L. REv. 504, 525 & n.189 (1959).
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damagesy, or have recognized their existence but held that since they do
not amount to a taking they are non-compensable18 A recent Kansas case"°
seems an exception. Two resolutions were passed by a municipal board of
commissioners: one found an area to be blighted; the other approved the
urban renewal agency's plan for the area. The landowners apparently sued
before the declaration of taking (petition of condemnation) was filed. The
Supreme Court of Kansas, affirming the grant of an injunction, held that
passage of the resolutions was arbitrary, and indicated, when it referred to
"the action of the Commission in passing the two resolutions taking [the]
property,"2 that their passage may have constituted a taking.
17. A clear statement of this position is found in Thompson v. Fayette County, 302
S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1957). This case involved a resolution of the Fayette County Fiscal
Court to open a street:
We are confronted with the effect of the resolution of the Fiscal Court. Appellees
assert the action taken was simply a first step in the opening of this street prior
to condemnation, and the resolution itself did not effect a "taking" of property
rights. This position is sound.
Surely no street came into being upon the passage of the resolution. It seems
clear . . . that the "establishment" of the street constitutes a designation of it.
... The resolution of the Fiscal Court must be construed as identifying the new
roadway ultimately to be established when necessary further procedural steps have
been taken. Therefore the resolution, standing alone, took nothing from appel-
lants.
Id. at 551. The following authorities also support this position: United States v. Sponen-
barger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939); Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939); City
of Chicago v. Lederer, 274 Ill. 584, 113 N.E. 883 (1916); Hamer v. State Highway
Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957); Glaves, supra note 1, at 329; Annot., 64 A.L.R.
546 (1929); see City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 489,
appeal dismissed sub nom., Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 373 U.S. 542 (1963); Grisanti
v. City of Cleveland, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 143, 179 N.E.2d 798 (C.P. Cuyahoga County
1961), appeal dismissed per curiam, 173 Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568, appeal dismissed
per curiam, 371 U.S. 68 (1962). In its decision in State Road Dep't v. Chicone, 158
So. 2d .753, 758 (Fla. 1963), the court said that depression or depreciation in the value
due to the "prospect" of condemnation is generally not compensable. Contra, Housing
& Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 273 Minn. 256, 141 N.W.2d 130
(1966); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963);
City of Cincinnati v. Mandel, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 224 N.E.2d 179 (C.P. Hamilton
County 1966). In the Minneapolis Metropolitan Co. case, supra, MINN. STAT. ANN. §
462.445(3) (1964) required discounting any increase due to the value of the project.
The court held that the statute operated to bar the consideration of a decrease as well.
18. Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve Dist., 377 Ill. 208, 36 N.E.2d 245 (1941); St. Louis
Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964); Bakken v. State, 142 Mont.
166, 382 P.2d 550 (1963); Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d
837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958); Sorbino v. New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554,
129 A.2d 473 (1957) (depreciation due to legislation is just an incident of ownership);
City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (an "incidental"
damage), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965). Contra, Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.
Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
19. Offen v. City of Topeka, 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960).
20. Id. at 390, 350 P.2d at 35. The court went on to state that "where a private citi-
zen is likely to be injured in some special manner or whose situation is peculiarly affeeted
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Peripheral damages also occur when the property is designated on an
urban renewal project map or at the site of a public improvement.2 It
has generally been held, however, that the mere act of locating, mapping,
or plotting a proposed project does not amount to a taking of land in the
constitutional sense of the term22. Only an "unreasonable" exercise of the
mapping power will be compensable. In Miller v. Beaver Falls,2" a statute
gave the public agency a period of three years to acquire land after its reser-
vation for park and playground purposes. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held this delay to be an unconstitutional freeze on value in that it
constituted a cloud on the title.2 The length of delay which a court will
find unreasonable is open to question, however. For instance, one court
upheld a zoning ordinance which allowed a three year reservation of prop-
erty which advance planning had designated for acquisition for reservoir
purposes."
The third point at which it has been urged, unsuccessfully, that damage
begins and taking occurs, is the filing of the condemnation petition.2 While
by the exercise of usurped authority, he may maintain an action for injunctive relief."
Thus, even without a finding that the resolutions constituted a taking, the same result
might be reached on the basis that they damaged the property. See also City of Cleve-
land v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963); City of Cincinnati v.
Mandel, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 224 N.E.2d 179 (C.P. Hamilton County 1966).
21. Other pre-filing activities can also cause peripheral damages. These include the
determination that a study should be made of the feasibility of undertaking the project,
preparation of surveys and planning reports, gathering of preliminary ownership and
title information, preparation of formal urban renewal documents, agreement between
the various agencies involved, holding of public hearings, approval of the plan, and
certification by local, state, and federal authorities. HousE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS,
supra note 7, at 65.
22. Note, Eminent Domain and the Planning of Public Streets in Pennsylvania, 13
U. PITT. L. REv. 553, 554 (1952) and cases there cited. See also 2 P. NICHOLS, supra
note 3, § 6.12. See generally Glaves, supra note 1, at 331-36.
23. 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
24. Accord, State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960);
see Mandelker, supra note 8, at 455, 467 & n.91.
25. Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 35 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1963); Mandelker, supra note 8, at 456 & n.49. Even in Pennsylvania it has been
said that a delay of five years is permissible when a street is being plotted. In re Philadel-
phia Parkway, 295 Pa. 538, 145 A. 600 (1929); see Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189,
192-96, 82 A.2d 34, 36-37 (1951) (dictum on the difference between reserving property
for street purposes and reserving property for park purposes).
26. See Limerick, supra note 6, at 4. Limerick points out that the filing encumbers
the land, impedes its transfer, and, although it vests no interest in the condemnor,
destroys the fee simple estate of the owner.
The same result can follow negotiations for voluntary purchase. Chicago Housing
Auth. v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); see Hamer v. State Highway
Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957). Again, the peripheral damages are non-com-
pensable. Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve Dist., 377 Ill. 208, 36 N.E.2d 245 (1941).
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damages sustained before the filing are not compensable, the landowner
supposedly receives just compensation for the value of his property at the
time of filing.27 However, there can be long delays, during which depre-
ciation continues, in the process between filing and the adjudication of
value.2 Because of the time lags before view and trial, it is often difficult
to determine the value of the property as of the time of filing.20 While
courts have recognized that depreciation can result from condemnation
proceedings, this damage, too, has been held non-compensable.30
27. Note 1 supra and accompanying text.
28. Note 11 supra and accompanying text.
29. See City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1961); Glaves, supra note 1, at 328.
The problem here is similar to the problem created by the lapse of time between the
filing of the petition (the usual date of valuation) and the date upon which actual
valuation is made in the courtroom. If actual valuation is long after the date of filing,
it may be impossible because of subsequent depreciation to determine value accurately.
See generally Glaves, supra note 1. "A particular valuation date will effectively de-
termine where the burdens and benefits of the market effects will fall." Id. at 321.
30. The court has not overlooked an additional objection made by certain defend-
ants that under the statutory scheme for condemnation there has already been an
uncompensated "taking" of property in this case. The reasoning seems to be that
the very filing of this suit interferes with the normal freedom of an owner to use
and dispose of his property. But such interference is inherent in all condemnation
proceedings. No case has been cited or found which supports the view that the con-
demnation action itself constitutes a taking. The court finds no merit in it.
Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D.C.V.I. 1960)
(emphasis added); accord, Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 470, 7 P.2d 622 (1932),
overruled on other grounds, In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 (1934); Housing
Auth. v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); State ex rel. City of St. Louis
v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (1933) (decrease in rental value and inability
to sell property during pendency of proceedings are "personal" damages); Sorbino v.
City of New-Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d 473 (1957) (dictum); see State
Road Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963); A. Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City
of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541 (1944); 2 P. NicHOLS, supra note 3, §
6.13[3].
Aside from announcement, mapping, and institution of proceedings, there are other
municipal actions which can result in peripheral damages. The holdings are unclear
as to whether peripheral damages caused by such acts will entitle the owner to compen-
sation.
It is generally held that the condemnor may not by deliberate acts reduce the value
of the property. Old Colony & Fall River R. R. v. County of Plymouth, 80 Mass. (14
Gray) 155 (1859); In re Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896
(1965); City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 177 N.E.2d 811 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1961); 2 P. NicHOLS, supra note 3, §§ 6.1[1], 6.21; cf., in the zoning
context, City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785
(1961). There is no agreement, however, as to what constitutes "deliberate acts," beyond
those undertaken by the city in bad faith or to encourage depreciation. Foster v. City of
Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); In re Elmwood Park Project, supra; Ap-
plication of Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup.
Ct. 1965); see Foster v. Herley, 207 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Eckhoff v. Forest
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Since the courts, with very few exceptions, have refused to redefine the
concept of "taking," the time at which the owner can challenge the con-
demnor's right to condemn becomes a very important issue. The earlier he
can challenge, the less serious will be his non-compensable peripheral dam-
ages.
I. METHODS OF CHALLENGING THE CONDEMNOR'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN
The condemnee now has the right in all jurisdictions to challenge, on a
variety of grounds, the condemnor's right to condemn.31 The issue of right
is different from that of public use, which in most public programs has
been settled in favor of the condemnor." Challenging right often involves
an attack on the legislative authority to condemn blighted areas, or on the
condemnor's compliance in fact with such authority.3
Preserve Dist., 377 Ill. 208, 36 N.E.2d 245 (1941). In some cases, however, acts which
appeared to be deliberate and which resulted in damages, were held to be non-compen-
sable. For instance, one court held that letters sent to tenants notifying them of intent
to condemn and causing them to move did not constitute a taking. State v. Vaughan,
319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Nor will abandonment of the proceedings and
refiling of the petition always entitle the landowner to compensation, unless he can estab-
lish the bad faith of the condemnor in seeking to avoid the high award granted in the
first proceeding. City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
On the other hand, there are decisions holding that the award cannot be decreased as
a result of depreciation caused by actions which are merely the normal procedures in-
volved in project execution. City of Cincinnati v. Mandel, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 224
N.E.2d 179 (C.P. Hamilton County 1966); see City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio
App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963). The court in Carcione emphasized that valuation
should be made at a date "immediately before the City . .. took active steps to carry
out the work of the project which to any extent depreciated the value of the property."
Id. at 533, 190 N.E.2d at 57 (emphasis added).
31. A. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION AND PROCEDURE §§ 201, 236 (1957).
One purpose of the condemnation petition in many states is to establish the condemnor's
right to take. Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, 11 MERCER L. Rav. 245, 268
(1960).
32. It has long been held that condemnation for highways and urban renewal is for
a public use. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 3, §§ 7.512, 7.51561.
33. Although the question of what constitutes a challenge to right is beyond the scope
of this note, an example will be found in note 115 infra. In deciding what issues go to
the question of right, subtle distinctions must often be made. Compare In re Certain
Parcels of Land, 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966), with State v. Land Clearance for
Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44 (1954); cf. Rothwell v. Coffin, 122 Colo.
140, 220 P.2d 1063 (1950); City of Chicago v. Riley, 16 Ill. 2d 257, 157 N.E.2d 46
(1959) ; Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 144 N.E. 132 (1924) (interpret-
ing OHIO GEN. CODE § 3680, presently OHIO REv. CODE § 719.05 (1953)); Costello,
supra note 2, at 53. In In re Certain Parcels of Land, supra, a challenge on the basis
that the condenmee's property was not blighted was considered by the court to be a
challenge to the authority's right to condemn. In State v. Land Clearance for Redev.
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There are four points in the process at which the condemnee can raise
the issue of right to condemn, all of which, unfortunately, are likely to occur
long after damage has begun. Nonetheless, even a few months difference
can be significant to an owner responsible for taxes and utilities of a build-
ing producing little or no income.
A. Challenge After Compensation is Awarded
A procedure of some antiquity, followed in only a few modern juris-
dictions, permits the challenge to the condemnor's right only after the
amount of the award has been determined."' This method delays adjudica-
tion of right to the latest possible time, and hence maximizes peripheral
damage.
The few jurisdictions following this practice implement it in different
ways. North Carolina allows the challenge only on appeal,"5 while Califor-
nia leaves it to the trial judge to consider the challenge at trial or to reserve
the question until the jury has reached its verdict on compensation. 0 In
Kansas, until recently, a challenge as part of the condemnation proceed-
ings could be had only on appeal, although the issue could be raised earlier
in a separate suit in equity.37 In 1963, the Kansas legislature amended the
eminent domain statute to eliminate the need for recourse to equity, and to
allow the challenge to be made as soon as the petition of condemnation is
filed.3 ' A recent Minnesota case 9 involved the City of Austin, whose charter
authorized the Common Council to carry out the entire condemnation
itself, including the appointment of appraisers and the awarding of the
compensation. The landowner was given the right to appeal to the state
district court within ten days after the Council's resolution confirming the
award. The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld this procedure, holding
Auth., supra, the condemnee challenged solely on the basis that the entire area was not
blighted. The court refused to adjudicate this issue on the basis that "the decision of
what property is to be taken is a legislative and not a judicial function." Id. at 994, 270
S.W.2d at 56. The condemnee's petition in the Riley case, supra, alleged that the con-
demnee had accepted the authority's offer for the purchase of the property and prayed
for dismissal of the condemnation suit, or, in the alternative, that judgment be entered
in the amount of the offer. The court held that this was in the nature of traverse and
questioned the condemnor's right to condemn.
34. See Town of Selma v. Noble, 183 N.C. 322, 111 S.E. 543 (1922).
35. Id.
36. Laguna Salada Union Elem. School Dist. v. Pacific Dev. Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d
470, 259 P.2d 498 (1953).
37. State v. Boicourt Hunting Ass'n, 177 Kan. 637, 282 P.2d 395 (1955).
38. KAN. GFN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501, -504 (1963).
39. City of Austin v. Wright, 262 Minn. 301, 114 N.W.2d 584 (1962).
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that the owner was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the ques-
tion of right before the Council. A judicial appeal after the Council set
the compensation was held to protect fully the owner's constitutional
rights.4"
B. Challenge at Valuation Trial
A substantial minority of jurisdictions allows the challenge to be made
at the valuation trial."' In a recent case ' 2 typifying this procedure, the
property owners challenged a taking by answer to the condemnation
petition. The applicable statute provided that "any issue raised in the
answer or other pleading filed, putting in issue the right of the agency to
condemn the property shall be promptly heard. . ."" The agency ar-
gued that the statute required the court to hear the issue of right only
after final judgment on valuation had been entered." The court disagreed,
holding that the procedure suggested by the agency would permit a taking
without the hearing expressly required by the statute.45 The court's solu-
tion was to require a hearing on the issue of right at the proceeding to
determine the award, but before the entry of the judgment granting the
agency possession. The court's solution is preferable to the agency's, but
it still postpones the prompt hearing required by the statute to a time
after the appraisers' report is submitted. In other states, either decisionally
or by statute, the determination of right must be made by the judge prior to
submitting the question of compensation to the jury."
A decision that the trial is the proper place to raise the issue of right
means that the exercise of eminent domain is treated as an ordinary law
suit in which all defenses are raised at trial. In the ordinary law suit, how-
ever, damages are not likely to be irreparably aggravated with each delay
40. Id. at 306, 114 N.W.2d at 587; cf. 6 P. NiCHOLS, supra note 3, § 25.3[1]:
"Certiorari takes the place of the hearing by the court upon the adjudication of the right
to take which is a necessary step in condemnation by judicial proceedings." See also
Town of Selma v. Noble, 183 N.C. 322, 111 S.E. 543 (1922) (based on a questionable
interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1871-72), presently N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-
16 (1966)).
41. 2 J. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 602 (3d ed. 1909).
42. Idol v. Knuckles, 383 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1964).
43. Ky. REv. STAT. § 99.420(5) (1963).
44. In making this contention the agency relied upon another section of the statute
which provided that the agency may file a demand for an interlocutory judgment at any
time prior to the entry of final judgment and after the report and award of the appraisers
is filed. Ky. REv. STAT. § 99.420(9) (1963).
45. Idol v. Knuckles, 383 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Ky. 1964).
46. Stein v. Darby, 126 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (interpreting FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 704.04 (Supp. 1966) (enacted in 1953)); Brown v. Calumet River Ry.,
125 Ill. 600, 18 N.E. 283 (1888) (decisionally).
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in the proceedings. While the delay under this method is not quite as
long as when the challenge is postponed until after compensation is
awarded, both procedures allow peripheral damages to accumulate longer
than is necessary.
C. Challenge After Filing of Condemnation Petition
The majority of jurisdictions allows a hearing on the issue of right
during the condemnation proceedings, but in limine,4" i.e., before the ap-
pointment of appraisers to determine the compensation." The determi-
nation of the issue of right can be made by the court either as part of the
general proceeding or in an entirely separate hearing.4" In those jurisdic-
tions which allow a challenge to the right to condemn after filing, the
challenge may be raised by one of three methods: by answer, by motion
to dismiss, or by a separate suit in equity.
47. 6 P. NiCHOLS, supra note 3, § 26.3:
It is the usual practice in the states in which condemnation is effected by judicial
proceedings for a hearing to be held at which the petitioner is called upon to es-
tablish its right to condemn the land described in the petition, before any action
is taken toward appointing commissioners, or sending the case to a jury to de-
termine the compensation or damages to be awarded.
dccord, County Bd. of School Trustees v. Batchelder, 7 Ili. 2d 178, 130 N.E.2d 175
(1955); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Birkett, 217 Md. 476, 143 A.2d 485 (1958).
48. State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955) (DEL. CoDE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6107 (1953)); Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527
(1929); State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963) (N.J. REv.
STAT. § 20:1-2 (1953)); In re Parking Fields 11 & 11A, 217 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); 2 J. LEwis, supra note 41, §§ 589, 602. In Washington, it is the first part
of a three part procedure. Mercer Island School Dist. No. 400 v. Victor Scazo, Inc.,
54 Wash. 2d 539, 342 P.2d 225 (1959).
The hearing can be conducted without waiting for further action by the public
authority. State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, supra, at 180, 112 A.2d at 860-61. On
the other hand, it may not be impermissible to wait for a considerable length of time
after the filing. In Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 256 F.2d 241 (3d
Cir. 1958), it was held that the fact that the landowner waited two and one half years
after the filing did not bar the challenge because of laches. Rather, his case was stronger
because the delay was for the purpose of seeing what use the county was planning to
make of the land. This decision is superseded by the new Pennsylvania Eminent Do-
main Code, notes 78-80 infra and accompanying text.
49. Metropolitan Seattle v. Kenmore Properties, Inc., 67 Wash. 2d 923, 410 P.2d
790 (1966); 6 P. NicHOLS, supra note 3, § 26.3 and cases there cited. In any event, the
issue of right has been tried by the court, rather than by the jury. Laguna Salada Union
Elem. School Dist. v. Pacific Dev. Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 470, 259 P.2d 498 (1953); City
of Chicago v. Riley, 16 Ill. 2d 257, 157 N.E.2d 46 (1959); Idol v. Knuckles, 383 S.W.2d
910 (Ky. 1964) (based on Ky. R v. STAT. § 99.420(5) (1963)); Potomac Elec. Power
Co. v. Birkett, 217 Md. 476, 143 A.2d 485 (1958); State Highway Comm'n v. Yost
Farm Co., 142 Mont. 239, 384 P.2d 277 (1963) (based on MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §
93-9911(4) (1964)); Metropolitan Seattle v. Kenmore Properties, Inc., supra; 2 J.
LEwis, supra note 41, § 602; Costello, supra note 2, at 54.
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1. By Answer
The most common preliminary means of challenging the right to con-
demn is by answer to the condemnor's petition."0 The owner is required
to challenge the right by answer, if he is to do so at all, even if he is not
permitted to file an answer on the issue of damages.5' In a series of
opinions involving challenges brought in equity, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that the objection must be raised by answer.52 The court
felt that this procedure provided an adequate remedy at law, foreclosing
the right to resort to equity.
Federal procedure likewise now provides for raising the objection by
answer.5" For many years, federal condemnation actions had been gov-
erned by the Conformity Act,5 which required suits in the district courts
to follow state procedure. Federal Rule 81 (a) (7), in accordance with the
Conformity Act, made the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable
to condemnation suits, except as to appeals.55 The diversity of state prac-
tices resulted in confusion and conflicting decisions in federal condemnation
proceedings.5" The policy of conformance was reversed in 1951 with the
50. State v. Fahey, 146 Conn. 55, 147 A.2d 476 (1958); State v. 0.62033 Acres of
Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955) (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6107 (1953));
Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527 (1929); A. JAHE., supra note 31,
§ 233. The rule in Wilton, supra, has been changed by FLA. STAT. § 74.04 (1964).
51. 6 P. NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 26.13:
In some jurisdictions, while the owner does not forfeit his right to be heard upon
the question of damages by failure to file an answer, it is thought to be the better
practice, if not absolutely necessary, for the respondent to set up by answer any
objections to the validity of the attempted taking not appearing on the face of
the petition.
Nichols cites cases in Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and West Virgina. See also, with respect
to federal procedure, note 58 infra and accompanying text.
52. Pittsburgh Rys. v. Port of Allegheny County Auth., 415 Pa. 177, 202 A.2d
816 (1964); Cunfer v. Carbon Airport Auth., 414 Pa. 408, 200 A.2d 768 (1964);
Balazick v. Dunkard-Bobtown Municipal Auth., 414 Pa. 182, 199 A.2d 430 (1964);
Schwab v. Burgess and Town Council of the Borough of Pottstown, 407 Pa. 531, 180
A.2d 921 (1962); Creasy v. Lawler, 389 Pa. 635, 133 A.2d 178 (1957); Gardner v.
Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e); Drafters' Comment to Rule 71A; Maun v. United
States, 347 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. City of Tacoma, 330 F.2d
153, 156 (9th Cir. 1964).
54. 25 Stat. 357 (1888); 40 U.S.C. § 258 (1952).
55. FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a) (7); Dolan, New Federal Procedure in Condemnation
Actions, 39 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1953).
56. Dolan, supra note 55, at 1072. See generally Morton, Basic Principles and
Practices in Federal Condemnation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 10-20 (1960); Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 357
(1946); Armstrong, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules for Civil Procedure, 4
F.R.D. 124, 134 (1946).
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repeal of Rule 81 (a) (7) and its replacement by Rule 71A, which super-
cedes the Conformity Act.5 Under Rule 71A(e), no answer is required or
contemplated unless the owner seeks to contest the right of the petitioner
to acquire the property. 8
2. By Motion to Dismiss
In some jurisdictions a motion to dismiss is required to raise the objec-
tion to the condemnor's right to condemn. The Illinois Supreme Court, in
Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Lewis, 9 held that although
no answer or plea is required of the condemnee, he must challenge the con-
demnor's right by motion to dismiss.
3. By Separate Suit in Equity
Many states, while recognizing the condemnee's right to challenge the
right to condemn in the period between filing and appointment of ap-
praisers, deny him the opportunity to raise the objection during the con-
demnation proceedings in the trial court. Either the statute does not pro-
vide for an answer or motion to dismiss for raising the challenge, 0 or the
courts have held that the only issue triable in the proceedings is the ques-
tion of damages." In either case, since the issue of right to condemn can-
not be raised at the proceedings, there is no adequate remedy at law; the
landowner's only recourse is a suit for an injunction.62
57. All new Federal Rules must be reported to Congress and take effect only if 90
days elapse without congressional action. Thereafter, all laws in conflict with a new
rule are of no further force or effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1959) ; Historical Note to 40
U.S.C. § 258 (1952).
58. Dolan, supra note 55, at 1074; Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 71A.
59. 344 I1. 253, 176 N.E. 345 (1931); accord, Board of Educ. v. City of Chicago,
402 Ill. 291, 83 N.E.2d 714 (1949); Village of Depue v. Banschback, 273 Ill. 574,
113 N.E. 156 (1916); Costello, Challenging the Right to Condemn, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 52, 53.
60. A. JAHR, supra note 31, § 236.
61. Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 144 N.E. 132 (1924); accord,
Colgate v. Philadelphia Elec. Power Co., 20 F.2d 263, 264 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed
mem., 276 U.S. 589 (1927); In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes,
17 Ohio Op. 2d 29, 31, 176 N.E.2d 607, 609 (C.P. Ashtabula County 1961).
62. Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 449, 144 N.E. 132, 134 (1924);
A. JAHR, supra note 31, § 236; accord, Emery v. City of Toledo, 121 Ohio St. 257,
167 N.E. 889 (1921) (based on OHo GEN. CoDE § 3677, now OHio REv. CODE §
719.01 (Anderson 1953)); Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 143, 149,
179 N.E.2d 798, 805 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961), appeal dismissed per curiam, 173
Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568, appeal dismissed per curiam, 371 U.S. 68 (1962);
see Jones v. Brown, 82 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1955); Hagans v. Excelsior Elec. Membership
Corp., 207 Ga. 53, 60 S.E.2d 162 (1950); City of San Antonio v. Trease, 243 S.W.2d
187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (interpreting TEx. R. Civ. P. 638). But see Ferguson
v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wis. 2d 556, 93 N.W.2d 460 (1958).
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In a decision which was contrary to earlier Pennsylvania court deci-
sions, 3 the United States Third Circuit held that under Pennsylvania pro-
cedure it is proper, if not necessary, to test the validity of condemnation
in a court independent of that in which compensation is awarded.64 This
conflict among the courts was finally resolved by the Pennsylvania legis-
lature, as will be detailed below.6"
An unusual provision in the Kansas statutes6 6 required the condemnor
to apply to the judge of the district court, rather than to the court itself.
The state supreme court held, because of this, that condemnation proceed-
ings were in the nature of an inquest, and that no challenge could be made
by answer because no lawsuit was involved. 7 The court further held that
common law equitable remedies were available to landowners seeking to
protect their property interests. "[Ilnjunction, brought by the landowner in
a separate and distinct action . . . is a proper remedy .. ."68 Kansas' new
eminent domain code authorizes the filing of the petition in the state dis-
trict court69 and requires the judge to make a finding of right before ap-
pointing appraisers," thus effectively nullifying the earlier holding."'
4. Trend Toward Early Adjudication
The trend today is toward requiring determination of the right to con-
demn as quickly as possible after the petition is filed. Federal procedure
63. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
64. Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958). In
so deciding, the Court of Appeals ignored the pre-1958 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions holding that equity had no jurisdiction over condemnation issues (note 52
supra), and relied upon lower court decisions: Colgate v. Philadelphia Elec. Power Co.,
20 F.2d 263 (E.D. Pa. 1927); Englehart v. Westmoreland Water Co., 165 Pa. Super 156,
67 A.2d 775 (1949). See also Cheltenham Township v. Tookany Land Dev. Co., 83
Montg. 281, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 661 (Pa. Quart. Sess. 1964) (dictum).
Although the Afashuda case, supra, was decided in the federal courts, a state rather
than a federal condemnation proceeding was involved; jurisdiction was based on diver-
sity of citizenship. For this reason, the Third Circuit had to decide the case under
Pennsylvania law rather than Federal Rule 71A, discussed in notes 53-58 supra and
accompanying text.
65. Notes 109-13 infra and accompanying text.
66. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-201, -202 (1949).
67. State v. Boicourt Hunting Ass'n, 177 Kan. 637, 282 P.2d 395 (1955).
68. Id. at 645, 282 P.2d at 401.
69. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501 (1963).
70. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (1963).
71. Cf. Kansas Home Dev. Co. v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 181 Kan. 925, 317 P.2d
794 (1957).
There are two cases involving separate suits in equity that suggest the possibility that
equity could provide a method for challenging the right to condemn before the filing of
the petition. See notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text.
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is indicative. Under Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
condemnee must object within twenty days of the filing." If the challenge is
not made within the prescribed time period, it is deemed waived."
The trend is also illustrated by the increasing prevalence of quick-take
statutes,' which are an alternative to the normal condemnation proce-
dure. These provisions vest immediate possession in the condemnor upon
payment into court of an estimated amount of compensation. If the owner
wishes to challenge the right to condemn, he must do so immediately so
that title can quickly vest in the condemnor." The Illinois quick-take sta-
tute requires the court to fix a date for the hearing of all issues not more
than five days after the filing of the petition."6 After the hearing, assum-
ing the challenge to the right to condemn is unsuccessful, the public au-
thority is free to take immediate possession since the only remaining issue
is that of compensation.77 Under Pennsylvania's 1964 Eminent Domain
Code, quick-take is the exclusive procedure. The condemnee is required
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e); notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text. A similar
procedure is authorized under MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-9909 (1964), but limits
the period to 15 days. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-9911 (1964) authorizes a hear-
ing on the issue of right after which the judge can issue an order that the condemna-
tion may proceed.
73. Morton, supra note 56, at 15; Dolan, supra note 55, at 1074; see United States
v. 1,108 Acres of Land, 25 F.R.D. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). It has been held that a
court is without jurisdiction to extend the 20 day period. United States v. Rands,
224 F. Supp. 305 (D. Ore. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.2d 186 (9th
Cir. 1966). Note, however, that if holding the objection to be waived would work
substantial injustice on the condemnee, he may be permitted to raise the challenge even
if he has exceeded the 20 day limit. United States v. 1,108 Acres of Land, supra,
held that a landowner would be entitled to an extension under FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b).
The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the 20 day provision of Rule 71A(e) is permissive
rather than mandatory. Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186 (1966).
74. Quick-take statutes embody an administrative method of condemnation. Although
half of the states have such provisions, only a few authorize the procedure for urban
renewal projects. Note, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by
Eminent Domain, 1964 DuxE L.J. 123, 136-37.
75. FLA. STAT. § 74.051 (Supp. 1965).
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2.2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966) (applies to high-
ways only).
77. In interpreting the statute, the Illinois Supreme Court has stressed that the
policy is to place possession and title in the state prior to final determination of just
compensation while protecting the interest of the landowners by requiring an early hear-
ing. Department of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Dust, 19 Ill. 2d 217, 166 N.E.2d 36
(1960). See generally Limerick, Procedure Under the Illinois Eminent Domain Act,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 19. Under the normal Illinois eminent domain procedure, right
can be challenged by a traverse or motion to dismiss. 1d. at 14-15; note 59 supra and
accompanying text.
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to file his preliminary objections, which may include a challenge to the right
to condemn, within thirty days after service of notice of taking by the
public authority." The court must hold a prompt hearing on the objec-
tions. 9 The condemnor is entitled to immediate possesssion of the property
upon written offer to pay the estimated compensation to the condemnee.
If the condemnee refuses to deliver possession, he is given five days to show
why a writ of possession should not immediately issue upon deposit in
court of the estimated compensation."s The issue of right can be raised
in this pleading also.
D. Challenge Before Filing of Condemnation Petition
Implications in recent opinions indicate the possibility of challenging
the right to condemn before the petition is filed. Even in the few decisions
which have discussed the procedure, however, judicial approval is unclear."'
The decision most clearly supporting this procedure is the Connecticut
case of Graham v. Houlihan.82 Connecticut law requires a hearing on the
final project report at which opportunity is given for all affected persons
to be heard." This hearing occurs before the institution of condemnation
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1966):
(a) Within thirty days after being served with notice of condemnation, the
condemnee may file preliminary objections to the declaration of taking. The court
upon cause shown may extend the time for filing preliminary objections. Pre-
lininary objections shall be limited to and shall be the exclusive method of
challenging (1) the power or right of the condemnor to appropriate the con-
demned property unless the same has been previously adjudicated; . . . or (4)
the declaration of taking. Failure to raise these matters by preliminary objections
shall constitute a waiver thereof.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1966):
(e) The court shall determine promptly all preliminary objections and make
such preliminary and final orders and decrees as justice shall require, including the
revesting of title.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407 (Supp. 1966), modeled after 40 U.S.C. §
258 (1964) :
(a) The condemnor after filing the declaration of taking, shall be entitled to
possession or right of entry upon payment of, or a written offer to pay to the con-
demnee, the amount of just compensation as estimated by the condemnor. If a
condemnee thereafter refuses to deliver possession or permit right of entry, the
prothonotary upon praecipe of the condemnor shall issue a rule, returnable in
five days after service upon the condemnee, to show cause why a writ of possession
should not issue, upon which the court may issue a writ of possession conditioned
upon payment to the condenmee or into court of such estimated just compensation
and on such other terms as the court may direct.
81. Primary support for such a "rule" rests on three cases: Graham v. Houli-
han, 147 Conn. 321, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Offen v.
City of Topeka, 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960); Chapman v. Huntington Housing
Auth., 121 W. Va. 319, 3 S.E.2d 502 (1939). See also Bristol Redev. and Housing
Auth. v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288 (1956).
82. 147 Conn. 321, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960).
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 8-127 (1958).
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proceedings, but after public meetings on the preliminary report, munici-
pal and voter approval and publication of the final report, and the de-
signation of the affected properties. In the Graham case, a representative
of the owner appeared at the final project report hearing and spoke in
opposition to the plan, but offered no evidence and neither examined nor
cross-examined any witnesses. The court dismissed the owner's injunction
suit, upholding the preclusive effect of the statute. The court held that
the hearing constituted a full and fair determination on the issue of right
to condemn, because the owner had the right to appear, oppose, and pre-
sent evidence. It is thus necessary in Connecticut to raise the issue
of right before the condemnation. However, the advantage of this right to
an early challenge may have been gained at too great an expense: the
question is heard by an interested administrative body and cannot be ap-
pealed to the courts."4
Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority"5 involved a suit, undertaken
by owners before their property was condemned, to enjoin the city from pro-
ceeding further with certain realty developments and from acquiring land
for that purpose. Although the West Virginia Supreme Court denied the in-
junction on other grounds, it did not say that the action itself was improper.
This may indicate that such procedure is available to landowners in
West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Often v. City of To-
peka, 8 held that injunction was the proper remedy to challenge the right,
but the case is unclear as to whether or not the injunction was sought prior
to the filing of the petition." Although these last two decisions involve
petitions for injunction, they are considered here rather than with the
cases involving separate suits in equity because here the action was brought
prior to filing of the condemnation petition.
While challenging prior to filing limits peripheral damages, it is not
widely supported by case law and has serious drawbacks which will be
discussed in the next section. 8 Use of this procedure is further limited be-
84. The only issue which can be appealed is that of compensation. CONN. GFN.
STAT. REV. § 8-132 (1958), discussed in Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 331, 160
A.2d 745, 750, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960).
85. 121 W. Va. 319, 3 S.E.2d 502 (1939).
86. 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960).
87. The court did say that the "plan became a project [that] the Agency was
bound to execute, and . . . steps were being taken to acquire plaintiff's property by
eminent domain." Id. at 390, 350 P.2d at 35. The only acts which clearly appear,
however, are the passage of a resolution finding the area to be slum and blighted and
a resolution approving the plan. See also Johnson v. Preston, I Ohio App. 2d 62, 203
N.E.2d 505 (1963).
88. Notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
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cause it has been categorically rejected in some jurisdictions. Typical of
these is an Illinois holding that courts are powerless to act in condemnation
proceedings until the petition is filed, because until that time they have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.8 9 Some courts have restricted this
procedure by holding that it will only be available when property has been
taken without an exercise of eminent domain and the owner seeks to halt
the taking until just compensation can be determined."
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: THE EARLY YET PRACTICAL CHALLENGE
While in most cases the landowner is best protected from peripheral
damages by the earliest adjudication of the right to condemn,9 requiring
a hearing on the issue too early may produce undesirable consequences
from the condemnor's point of view.92 In an attempt to balance these two
conflicting interests, several proposals for an early challenge have been
advanced.93
89. Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Lewis, 344 Ill. 253, 255, 176 N.E.
345, 346 (1931) (based on what is now ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (Smith-Hurd
1950)); Limerick, supra note 77, at 4; accord, Loebner v. City of New York, 162
N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (action premature since redevelopment plans were still in
the initial stage); see City of Milwaukee v. Utech, 269 Wis. 132, 68 N.W.2d 719
(1955). See generally Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing
Urban Deterioration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 513-17 (1959).
90. Harrison v. City of East Point, 208 Ga. 692, 69 S.E.2d 85 (1958); Illinois Cities
Water Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 Ill. 2d 547, 144 N.E.2d 729 (1957); Webb v.
Dameron, 219 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Meagher v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953). The procedure is further restricted by
holding that while the action in equity will lie to restrain a taking without compensa-
tion, it will not lie to restrain an injury, because a suit at law for damages is an ade-
quate remedy. Scott v. City of Robinson, 404 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
91. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems in Eliminating and Preventing Urban De-
terioration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 517 (1959):
It would be desirable to provide a means by which issues of the legality of a plan
and action to be taken thereunder could be determined conclusively as early as
possible .... In achieving this objective, however, account must be taken of the
right of an individual to receive, at some time, a judicial hearing on questions of
the legality of official action which affects his property interests.
92. Notes 103-05 infra and accompanying text.
93. It is widely felt that the danger of peripheral damages is compelling enough to
require a change from present procedures:
Effective and equitable use of . . . [eminent domain], however, is hindered by
procedural laws which are far from creditable to an allegedly progressive society.
Urgently needed public works are delayd [sic] or made prohibitively expensive,
while the real interests of landowners are often more abused than protected ...
Yet the reform movements which have invaded practically every field of law
seem to have neglected condemnation procedure.
Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, 11 MERCER L. Rv. 245, 246 (1960); see
Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional Prac-
tice, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 319, 328 (1963); Note, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Re-
development Property by Eminent Domain, 1964 DuKE L.J. 123, 136.
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A. Challenge at the Public Hearing
One suggestion that has recently received much comment would permit
objections to the right to condemn to be raised during the public hearings
to determine the desirability and feasibility of the project.9" During the
plan approval process there are a number of public hearings. For instance,
federal law requires as a prerequisite to financial aid for urban renewal
that there be a public hearing held at the local level."9 Some state statutes
make hearings either mandatory or available upon application.", One of
these hearings can be designated as the proper time for the owner to raise
his challenge to the condemnor's right to condemn. This is the earliest op-
portunity built into the process at which a challenge might be made,9" and
has the added advantage of assuring a decision on the issue before the public
agency makes large financial committments.9"
The Connecticut statute previously discussed99 requires the condemnee
to object at the hearing on the final project report, and bars any subse-
quent adjudication of right. The Connecticut court approved this pro-
cedure, holding that since the owner was afforded a full opportunity to ap-
pear, the method constituted a complete hearing on the issue of the taking."'
94. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban De-
terioration, 72 H-Lv. L. Rav. 504, 514 (1959):
A public hearing is potentially more effective than a judicial proceeding in ac-
comodating the needs of the program to private interests. Such a hearing pro-
vides an opportunity for the presentation of objections and suggestions bearing
upon the desirability as well as the legality of public action.
See Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the Advocatory Process in Urban Redevelop-
ment, 45 CAL. L. REv. 134, 135 (1957); cf. Glaves, supra note 93, at 328 (date when
property was first mentioned for probable public acquisition or when designated as
blighted).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964).
96. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67/, §§ 91.11, -.12 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (mandatory);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 121, § 26KK (1960) (upon request).
97. The time of the hearing has been described as "the date when the improvement
became so probable that buyers and sellers would take it into account in their negotia-
tions." Glaves, supra note 93, at 328.
See also United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961): "The
Court must exclude any depreciation in value caused by the prospective taking once the
government 'was committed' to the project." While the decision considers the act of
authorizing or appropriating funds for a project as fixing the date of "commitment,"
this may not be early enough to protect the owner from the worst of the peripheral
damages. STAFF OF HousE Co M. ON PUBLIC WORKS, STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND
ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL
AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., 65 (Comm. Print 1964).
98. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban De-
terioration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 513-14 (1959).
99. Notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
100. Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833 (1960).
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While this procedure may be an expedient means for early disposal of
the issue of right to condemn, it allows the condemning agency to be the
sole judge of its own right and power.'' Perhaps this problem can be
solved if the owner is permitted, within a specified time, a judicial appeal
from the agency's decision. A further drawback is that the prospective
condemnee is forced to expend money and effort in a protest that may
occur before he can be sure that his property will be among those taken."02
There are a number of reasons why a challenge at this stage may not
present the best opportunity to litigate the question of right to condemn.
The public authority may be forced, before it is ready, to specify in the
plan which properties are to be taken.0 3 Of course, how specifically the
plan is drawn at the hearing stage will depend on what type of project is in-
volved. Hearings on highway projects occur before the route is designated,
while project boundaries are usually fairly well set by the time final hearings
are held on urban renewal plans. A second objection is that the challenge
by the condemnee can be narrowly conceived on the basis of his own lot;
his purpose may only be to prevent his property from being taken.' If
the project is of the type in which boundaries are flexible at the time of
the hearing, the authority will be interested solely in the general aspects
of project feasibility. In addition, a challenge at the final project plan
101. Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 144 N.E. 132 (1924).
102. Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 143, 179 N.E.2d 798 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1961), appeal dismissed per curiam, 173 Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d
568, appeal dismissed per curiam, 371 U.S. 68 (1962); accord, Emery v. City of To-
ledo, 121 Ohio St. 257, 167 N.E. 889 (1929); Note, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of
Redevelopment Property by Eminent Domain, 1964 Duxn L.J. 123, 134.
103. Glaves, supra note 93, at 357. The problem of forcing the authority to desig-
nate acquisition sites before it is ready can be alleviated by use of advance acquisition
procedure, such as that which is discretionary under the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23
U.S.C. § 108(a) (1966), and the Federal Urban Renewal Program, 42 U.S.C. §
1452(a) (1964). If a more widespread and judicious use is made of this procedure, the
land can be acquired and the rights of the parties settled long before the worst effects of
the peripheral damages are felt. It is possible, however, that the decision as to which
land is necessary cannot be made long enough before the actual necessity for taking
arises. Further, since taking at such an early stage involves a degree of speculation on
the part of the public authority, it may not be wise to require such a procedure. Finally,
if the decision to employ advance acquisition is left discretionary, it will lose much of its
efficacy in avoiding peripheral damages.
104. The challenge can also seek to prove that the condemnor has no right to con-
demn any parcels for the particular project. However, the plaintiffs in most of the cases
seek an adjudication as to their own lot. The leading case of Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954), for example, involved a department store owner who claimed that his
building was not blighted and therefore should not be condemned. Compare In re Cer-
tain Parcels of Land, 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1965), with State v. Land Clearance
for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44 (1954), both discussed in note 33
supra.
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stage may unduly reinforce the delay strategies of either the condemnor
or the condemnee. By the time the final plan is prepared the condemnor's
commitment may be substantial; the greater the public commitment, the
more reluctant the courts are likely to be to interfere with a project. On
the other hand, an early challenge may be abused by potential condemnees
who will pursue the relief, including court appeals, solely to delay the
taking of their property."0 5
B. Challenge After Approval of the Project Plan
Another suggestion would make it possible to raise the issue in court
within a reasonable time after the approval of the project plan."' As
already suggested, however, courts will not hear the controversy at such
an early stage." 7 Even when courts recognize that peripheral damages
may be generated by plan approval, they hold such damages non-compen-
sable. The rationale is that the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case in
the absence of a "taking." There are other theories courts have used to
avoid hearing a challenge to the right to condemn before condemnation:
the administrative action taken is insufficient to permit adjudication; the
owner has no standing; the court has no jurisdiction prior to the com-
mencement of proceedings.'08
C. Challenge After Filing
Finally, it is suggested that those jurisdictions not now doing so should
allow the challenge to right immediately after the filing of the petition.
This is the approach taken by the new Pennsylvania statute: title passes
to the condemnor upon filing of the petition of condemnation, but the
owner can file preliminary objections to contest the taking within thirty
days.' If the condemnor wishes immediate possession and the owner
refuses to allow entry, the owner has five days in which to show cause why
a writ of possession should not issue upon payment into court of the es-
timated compensation.10
105. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban De-
terioration, 72 HAmv. L. Rxv. 504, 515 (1959).
106. Note, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by Eminent Do-
main, 1964 DuKE L.J. 123, 135.
107. Notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
108. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban De-
terioration, 72 HARv. L. Rnv. 504, 516 (1959).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 26, § 1-406(a) (Supp. 1966). This provision is set out
in note 78 supra and discussed in the accompanying text. See generally E. SNITZER,
PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT DOMAIN § 406-1 (1965); Drafters' Comment to PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406(a) (Supp. 1966).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 26, § 1-407(a) (Supp. 1966). This provision is set out
in note 80 supra and discussed in the accompanying text.
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The Pennsylvania code was revised to clarify whether the challenge lay
collaterally in equity"' or by answer."' Even though there was a conflict
in the decisions, one authority felt that no problem existed because, in
practice, the question of right was almost never raised at the condemnation
proceeding."' The new statute reflects a policy that the question of right
should be disposed of as soon as possible after the petition is filed, and that
it is preferable to raise these matters in the condemnation proceeding rather
than in a separate suit.
The few cases which have arisen under the statute have effectuated this
policy and procedure. In In re Certain Parcels of Land,' 4 the condemnee
had filed his preliminary objections". with the Court of Common Pleas of
Lancaster County, the same court in which the redevelopment authority had
filed its declaration of taking. The court, ignoring the statutory procedure,
dismissed the preliminary objections and agreed with the authority's con-
tention that an action in equity was the proper procedure. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania vacated and remanded on the ground that the legis-
lature intended the statute to be a complete and exclusive method of chal-
lenge."' It was further held, in Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper Merion
Township,"' that the new statute contemplates two proceedings: the first
to determine the propriety of the taking, and the second to determine the
compensation.
The advantage of quick-take provisions such as Pennsylvania's is that
since there is a prompt determination of right, title vests and the condemnee
receives his compensation quickly. This enables the landowner to re-invest
and relieves him of the burden of holding the property under threat of
condemnation." 8 While this procedure by no means avoids the peripheral
damages occurring between planning and filing, it provides the earliest
111. Frank Mashuda Co. v. Allegheny County, 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958) and
related cases cited supra note 64.
112. Pittsburgh Rys. v. Port of Allegheny County Auth., 415 Pa. 177, 202 A.2d
816 (1964) and related cases cited supra note 52. See generally Drafters' Comment to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406(a) (Supp. 1966).
113. E. SNiTZER, supra note 109, § 406-1.
114. 420 Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966).
115. Including a challenge to the "power and right" of the Lancaster Redevelopment
Authority to condemn his property on the grounds that "the said property is not, in fact,
blighted .... [S]ince the only basis for the Authority's present taking is that the elimina-
tion of a blighted area is such a public use . . . Faranda seeks to show that the area is
not blighted thereby negativing the power or right of the Authority to condemn." Id.
at 300, 216 A.2d at 722 (emphasis in original).
116. Accord, Mahan v. Lower Merion Township, 418 Pa. 558, 212 A.2d 217 (1965);
Percy v. Commonwealth, 47 Erie 192 (1965).
117. 422 Pa. 227, 221 A.2d 292 (1966).
118. Wasserman, supra note 93, at 262 (discussing a similar New Jersey procedure).
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practicable challenge to right. The challenge is not so early that it forces
the condemnor to speculate on what land it will take, nor will the courts
refuse to hear it as prematurely brought.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful, in a practical sense, that many condemnees
will succeed in their challenges under this procedure. There will be great
pressures on the court to affirm the condemnor's action at this stage, because
the plan has progressed far enough that the condemnor is heavily committed
financially and otherwise. This procedure is subject to the further criticism
that it might discourage the adjudication of right: the ready availability
of compensation may persuade the owner not to challenge.
If determination of right at the time of filing does not eliminate all or
even most peripheral damages, other means of reducing them must be
found. The most obvious possibility is to define taking to include the de-
preciation which occurs prior to filing. While consideration of this proposal
is beyond the scope of this note, it may be said that the courts have been
reluctant to recognize as a taking anything other than physical disposses-
sion." ' If this problem is not solved by a redefinition of taking, peripheral
damage may ultimately require allowing the challenge to right before
filing, despite the legitimate problems which would be created for planning
agencies."'
119. See notes 18, 22, and 30 supra.
120. "If the designation of property for acquisition causes the value to decrease, then
the public should not benefit from its own action." Glaves, supra note 93, at 344.
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